Assess contending views about the major challenges facing the USA as a unique power in the contemporary international order.

In order to provide the required assessment of the obstacles faced by the USA in contemporary times, we must answer two fundamental questions within this essay.  To begin with, this essay will examine the current role of the USA in the modern world order.  Secondly, we will investigate the current challenges confronting the USA within that role.  In order to answer both of these questions, we will make use of the realist; English school; Marxist; and liberal internationalism; views of the role of the USA, and the challenges it currently faces.

Prior to these investigations and analyses, we must briefly explain what we mean by the use of the terms Realist, English (or Liberal Realism), Marxist and Liberal Internationalism schools within International Relations theory.  Realism is a term often used interchangeably with the term ‘power politics’.  It is a school of international thought that asserts that the states-system is anarchic, with relationships between states based on the power dynamics between them, which in turn are based on fundamental aspects of human nature (Baylis & Smith [Eds.], 2004, pg.95).  The English school of thought agrees with the assessment of the states-system as an anarchic system, but contends order arises from co-ordinating interactions to mutual advantage (Brown [Ed.], 2009, pg. 55).  Marxist views assert that international power and interdependence are shaped by the uneven development of capitalist economies, and that it is the critique of capitalism that should shape future international development. (Brown [Ed.], 2009, pg. 55-63)  Finally, the liberal viewpoint contends that international order arises from large absolute gains, but also that international order is shaped by economic actors as much as political actors. (Brown [Ed.], 2009, pg. 55)

Having elaborated on what we mean by the terms Realist, English, Marxist and Liberal schools in this context, we must now move to examine the current role of the USA in the modern world order.  Two interlinked notions of the role of the USA are worthy of consideration within this essay – that of the USA as a world leader, and that of the USA as a transformative force in the modern international order.

Francis Fukuyama’s now-infamous quote about the ‘end of history’ has formed the backbone of a running narrative which has asserted the primacy of the liberal order in the modern states-system since the demise of the USSR (Brown et al [Eds.], 2004, pg. 108).  This narrative has consistently reinforced the role of the USA as a world leader within that liberal order.  A Marxist analysis would suggest that this role has been achieved through the dominance of US economic and military powers, and through the use of mechanisms such as the Bretton-Woods Institutions – notably the IMF and the World Bank.  The liberal analysis is somewhat less relevant when analysing a liberal order, but would suggest that the spread of liberal capitalism has been a positive-sum game in which all capitalistic countries have benefitted from the American role in spreading Americanism.  The English school analysis would suggest that the role of the USA was vital in co-ordinating interactions with post-Soviet states after the collapse of the USSR which led to positive-sum outcomes for the development of capitalism in those countries, but also that relationships of dependence on the USA were formed as a result, cementing the position of the USA as a world leader.  Finally, a realist analysis would highlight the role of American control of military organisations such as NATO and the United Nations Security Council in cementing this liberal order.

The second notion of the role of the USA in the modern world order is the notion of the USA playing a transformative role within the world.  This notion is largely based on the US model of exceptionalism or Americanism – the idea that the US national interest is “simultaneously unique and universal” (Brown [Ed.], 2009, pg. 59).  As this essay will later expand upon, the spread of this model is generally classified as American imperialism within a Marxist analysis, critiquing the tendency to expand into pre-capitalist regions by force, and to employ coercion to organise political relations between regions of differing power (Brown [Ed.], 2009, pg. 62).  However, the liberal analysis, within which nation states are local guardians of commercial activity (Brown et al [Eds.], 2004, pg. 110), is one which has benefited greatly from the spread of Americanism (which will be expanded upon later in the essay), as liberalism as a political ideology found itself at the centre of the exceptionalist approach.  The realist analysis would suggest that the USA could make greater use of their global economic and military power to continue the Americanisation of the international order by seeking the increasing liberalisation of the EU, China and India, as well as the developing world.  A maintenance of realist assumptions can also be found in distinctly non-Americanisation developments such as the growth of the United Nations, where the retention of vetoes by five countries remains a significant nod to the importance to the international order of ‘power politics’ (Brown at al [Eds.], 2004, pg. 111).  Finally, the English school analysis lends itself to the positive-sum outcomes of the spread of the liberal order, with the interdependence of the USA and EU in trade terms an excellent example of the co-ordinated interactions encouraged by this analysis.

Having set-out what we mean by the terms realist, English school, Marxist and liberal, and analysed the current role of the USA within the world order, we must now turn our attention to the current challenges facing the USA within their role as a unique power in the contemporary international order.

It is the contention of this essay that there are three main challenges faced by the USA currently: a limitation on their room for action, the current crisis in capitalism, and inter-imperialist rivalries.  These three challenges each represent individual challenges to the ongoing role of the USA as a unique power, but combined represent the most serious threat to that role they have faced since the end of World War II.

In the aftermath of his inauguration, President Obama has been faced by major limitations on the room for the USA to act in two major directions.  Firstly, the transatlantic challenge to the economic dominance of the USA represents a limitation on their ability to use their economic power in order to dominate the international order. Secondly, questions about the use of military power against countries outside the liberal world (in particular in Afghanistan and Iraq) have diminished the ability of the USA to continue using their military capacity in this manner.  The actions of the USA in relation to both of these areas were entirely appropriate within the realist analysis, but without risking further diminution of their status (or use of military force), it would be impossible to consider continuing with a realist strategy.  The transatlantic challenge to US economic dominance has highlighted the paradox of the long-held US position of pushing capitalist economic development abroad, but also being challenged by such development.  However, both the liberal and English school analyses would welcome this development as an outcome of their positive-sum approaches, and would favour continuation of policies which push capitalistic economic development in non-liberal countries.  It is the Marxist analysis which is of most use to us in analysing the new limitations on the room for the USA to act.  This analysis would state that US dominance on the international world order has been completely dependent on the growth of capitalism, and that the nature of capitalism is such that it will always stimulate competition between capitalist states.

The second challenge faced by the USA in relation to their current role is the current crisis of capitalism.  As noted above, the spread of Americanism, by which we mean the “combination of mass production, a culture of mass consumption and the mass consumption of culture” ((Brown [Ed.] 2009, pg. 59) was transferable within other capitalistic countries.  As stated by Bright and Meyer, “…its emphasis on material progress and democracy, proved extraordinarily attractive” (Bright and Meyer, 2002, p. 86).  The downside of this spread of exceptionalism is now apparent, as the crisis of capitalism is viewed as one created in America.  The liberal acceptance of the role of the USA as a transformative force in capitalistic development around the world underlined the idea that this was a particularly American project, bringing into question for the first time the role of the USA as “hegemon in relation to the other liberal states” (Brown [Ed.], 2009, pg. 69).  This factor, combined with the impact of the crisis on the US domestic economy, as well as the growth of non-liberal models such as Russia and China serves as a particular challenge to the role of the US as a unique power in the contemporary world order.  From a realist perspective, the fact that the crisis of capitalism has become a negative-sum game indicates that the power exerted by US dominance of global capitalism has now become a liability to their stance within the international world order.

The third major challenge to the role of the USA is one which emerges quite clearly from the Marxist analysis.  The idea of inter-imperialist rivalry is usually a negative-sum game, referring to the escalation of competition between capitalist enterprises of different nationalities to political competition between states seeking to defend their interests (Brown [Ed.], 2009, pg. 63).  In the case of the USA, the potential for inter-imperialist rivalries injurious to their interests and world role are exacerbated by a paradox within their domestic and international models.  Domestically, it is clear that the USA has promoted a liberal economic agenda throughout the world since the end of World War II, encapsulated in the approach of the Bretton-Woods Institutions.  This is most obvious when viewing the conditionality of third-world aid, but is also apparent in the use of Marshall Aid in European states in the aftermath of the Second World War.  This agenda stands in direct contradiction to the protectionist policies which have been adopted domestically.  While these contradictory approaches have served the domestic US economy well over the last 50 years, it is clear that they have created a space within which the Leninist idea of inter-imperialist rivalry could flourish.  As discussed above, the ability of the USA to use a realist analysis to confront growing potential hegemons such as China has been limited in recent years, and it is also dubious whether such confrontation could be successful.

This essay has not sought to provide judgement on the values of the differing analyses of realism, liberalism, Marxism and English school thought in relation to the challenges facing the USA as a unique power in the contemporary international order.  However, we have sought to provide working definitions of these four strains of thought.  Furthermore, we have examined the two interlinked notions of the role of the USA in the modern world order using the tools provided by these analyses – the notions of leadership and transformative power.  Finally, we have explored the three major challenges to these roles faced by the USA within these critiques – the challenges of limited ability in light of recent international reputational damage, the challenges of the current crisis of capitalism, and the challenges of inter-imperialist rivalries.  It is the assertion of this essay that all four analyses provide us with tools with which we can assess the role and challenges facing the USA.

References:

Baylis, J & Smith, S (Eds.) (3rd Ed.), 2004, The globalization of world politics, USA: Oxford University Press.

Brown, W (Ed.) 2009, Reordering the International, Milton Keynes: The Open University.

Brown, W, Bromley, S & Athreye, S (Eds.) 2004, Ordering the International, London: Pluto Press/The Open University.

Bright, C & Mayer, M, 2002, Where in the world is America? The history of the USA in the global age in Bender, T (Ed.), 2002, Rethinking American History in a Global Age, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Today, July 1st, 2010, Dáil Éireann will pass the Civil Partnership Bill 2009.  Once it gets through the Seanad (which will happen, though I suspect it’ll get ugly), same-sex couples will be recognised by the state at last.  It’s not marriage, but it’s certainly progress.

I have a long history with this issue, and one I’m particularly proud of.  The Labour Party introduced the Civil Unions Bill in 2006.  In the few months leading up to that, I was a member of the Labour LGBT executive which decided they were in support of such legislation, and I played a small role in bringing LGBT groups in to discuss the draft legislation with the Labour Party legal advisor, and with Brendan Howlin – the sponsor of the Bill.  My role was not enormous – I did not draft the legislation, nor was I centrally involved in persuading Brendan Howlin to work on this area – he took that initiative all by himself.  Nevertheless, it is one of my times in politics that I am most proud of, and it was certainly one of the first times that I became aware that Ireland could be made a better place by the actions of a very small number of people.

It’s been a few years since that flurry of activity.  In the meantime, the Labour Party have reintroduced our bill twice, only for it to be voted down by the Government.  I’ve been involved with both Dublin Pride and the NLGF – both of which have taken staunchly pro-marriage, anti-partnership positions.  And yet, I’ve still waited and waited for this day, conscious of the breakthrough which it will come to represent.

I should probably provide some context for my own views.  Theoretically, academically, I am opposed to the institution of marriage, and indeed to derivatives of that institution such as Civil Partnerships.  It is a patriarchal institution which has been used to subjugate women for hundreds of years.  And regardless of the growth of civil marriage, it remains an institution derived from a sacrament in which I do not believe.  I believe society should seek to move beyond marriage – to dismantle the rights and responsibilities of that institution, and to recognise that increasing numbers of relationships do not fit within the model of the nuclear family.  Some relationships last for a long time, and some do not.  Some relationships consist of two people, and some do not.  Some relationships involve children, and some do not.  And some relationships involve sex, and some do not.  One model will never work for all these different types of relationships, and we should consider how rights and responsibilities could be accumulated within relationships as they evolve, rather than being dependent on one ceremony.  Theoretically, academically, these are my views.

Emotionally however, I sit in a very different space.  As I am yet again experiencing, new romance in my life fills me with emotional possibilities, and the attractions of monogamous, long-term relationships begin to appeal to me once more.  But as well as hope such as this, it angers me that society views the relationships of my friends as less than the relationship of my parents.  I want queers who want to marry to be allowed to marry.  And beyond that, I want them to feel safe walking down the street holding hands.  Or to raise their children without judgement.

And so I’m conflicted.  I want to make the radical argument against the institution of marriage.  But I want the loving relationships I see all around me to receive the respect they deserve.  And that can only happen when society embraces empowering structural change.

Tonight will see our society, through the democratically elected representatives of the people, embrace exactly that type of structural change.  If Fine Gael come onside, it is possible that as in 1993, all members of Dáil Éireann will come together to take a stand for progress.  The Green Party deserve enormous credit.  Enormous credit.  As the Labour Party were responsible for pushing Máire Geoghegan-Quinn to decrimilaise homosexuality, so the Green Party have taken this fight and forced Fianna Fáil to accept it.  Their role should not be undermined, and it will certainly not be forgotten.

In six months time, same-sex couples will be having Civil Partnership ceremonies to rival the most gaudy wedding.  Their engagements will become commonplace in the Irish Times.  And most of all, society will have shifted to recognising same-sex relationships instead of ignoring them.  The campaign for access to civil marriage for same-sex couples will continue, and that’s a good thing.  The campaign for same-sex couples to be treated equally in relationship to adoption will certainly gather pace.  And some of us will continue to make our arguments for a different way of recognising love.  But we’ll all be doing it from a better, more equal starting point.

That’s progress, and it’s been a privilege playing a tiny part in it.

In what ways and to what extent have changes in aid policies and in world economic conditions in the first decade of the twenty-first century increased the autonomy of African states in macroeconomic policy formation?

In answering the above question, we must begin by explaining what we mean when we discuss the autonomy of African states in the development of macroeconomic policy.  We must then examine the changes that have occurred in relation to aid policies over the last decade.  In addition to this, we must explore the changes that have occurred in world economic conditions during the same period, and examine how they have impacted aid dependency.  During all of this, we will analyse how these changes have altered the autonomy of African states in relation to the formation of macroeconomic policy.  This will be done with particular regard to the national income accounting framework, and with a particular focus on the economy of Tanzania.

It is the assertion of this essay that when we examine the development of aid policies, it will become clear that they have served to limit the autonomy of African states in the development of macroeconomic policy.  However, it will become equally clear that the development of world economic conditions over the last ten years has served to greatly enhance the autonomy of African states in macroeconomic policy formation.

As stated above, we must begin by elaborating on what we mean by discussing the autonomy of African states in this context.  As the African states began to achieve independence, their first priority was to assert their sovereignty, by which we mean an assertion of a claim to right to rule their countries independently. With sovereignty asserted, we saw the rise of development economics in the 1960s, with African states beginning to focus on the development of macroeconomic policies.  This was achieved through the introduction of macroeconomic government departments.  These departments often focussed on the development of policies to encourage savings or investment, with an awareness of the extreme importance of these areas on the national income accounting framework.

Achieving autonomy, by which we mean not only an assertion of the right to rule, but also an assertion of the ability to rule their countries independently, has been restrained over the last 50 years in two primary ways – external political pressures, and economic constraints.  After the development of African countries in the 1960s (a natural result of their new-found independence), the 1970s and early 1980s saw a crisis period in the African states.  Instead of moving towards restructuring their economies to reduce dependence on declining trade of primary commodities, most African states (under pressure from the IMF and World Bank) engaged in a rapid period of ‘temporary’ external borrowing to fund this decline.  The withdrawal of such external borrowing facilities after the Mexican debt crisis in 1981, saw the African states become more dependent on funding from the BWI (Bretton Woods Institutions), increasing the political pressure these institutions could exert on Sub-Saharan Africa. 

The adjustment years (from 1982 to the mid-1990s), then saw a substantial diminution of the macroeconomic autonomy of African states, as the BWI institutions exerted their dramatically increased influence to force African countries to embark on wide-scale programmes of privatisation and stabilisation, moving further away from the developmentalist model which had proved so successful for African states in the 1960s.  Using the example of Tanzania, we can examine some practical impacts of this move away from the developmentalist model.  In 1987, Public consumption and Investment in relation to output accounted for 39% of GDP, but these sectors accounted for only 23.3% of GDP by 2001, showing a substantial reduction in the size of the institutions of the state.

The even more obvious result of the move away from the developmentalist model can be found in the failure of the structural adjustments in Tanzania to address the economic structures of the country.  In this regard, the Berg report was particularly damaging, pushing as it did an agriculture-led development, which failed to address the need for the Tanzanian economy to expand into other sectors.  To state that more explicitly, the aim of the Berg report was to rely on the improvements to the traditional agricultural export sector to raise entire economy, instead of recognising that diversifying and developing in non-traditional sectors could potentially realise significantly greater rewards.

The period since 1995 has recently been written about as the ‘recovery period’, though this label is often accompanied by a question mark.  While external institutions have grudgingly admitted that the state may have a larger role to play in the development of African states through the agreement of the ‘Millenium Development Goals’, the end of the 20^th Century saw a lot of questions about the willingness of external actors and economic pressures to allow African states return to a greater level of autonomy over their macroeconomic policy formation.

Having explained what we mean when we discuss autonomy in this context, we must next examine the changes to aid policies which have occurred over the last ten years.  There are two particularly significant developments which have altered the development of aid policies over that period.  Firslty, through the establishment of NEPAD (New Economic Partnership for African Development) in 2001, African states have begun to embrace liberalisation.  By agreeing to move towards democracy, and improve governance standards, the African states hoped to attract increased aid.

The second, and arguably more significant development was the G8 deal agreed in Gleneagles, Scotland in 2005.  This agreement recognised the steps towards liberalisation taken by the African states through the establishment of NEPAD, and saw the G8 (a group comprising the UK, USA, Russia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and Italy, with representation from the EU) agree to cancel the debt of the 43 poorest countries in the world, dramatically increase aid to African states, and lift trading blocks (including export subsidies and import restrictions).

The net effect of these developments in aid policy was a substantial increase in aid pledges.  However, as figure 1 below shows, the G8 are currently substantially underperforming in relation to the commitments to increase aid to African states made at the Gleneagles summit.

Increases in ODA from G8 countries compared to Gleneagles commitments.

Despite this underperformance amongst the G8 countries, OECD aid to African states has certainly risen over the last ten years.  As figure 2 below shows, official aid flows had fallen during the 1990s, as countries such as Tanzania saw a rise in the % of GDP held in national savings, along with corresponding reductions in the size of their trade gaps.  However, as we can clearly see from figure 2, aid has grown erratically over the last decade, demanding a greater insight into the reasons for the continuing failure to narrow the trade gap in these developing countries.

Private Giving, Philanthropic and Remittance Flows from OECD Countries 1991-2007.

Arguably, the liberalisation of the economies of African states, intended to attract significantly greater aid donations, has not achieved this impact.  Instead, the adoption of these liberal economic policies have seen private investment rise substantially in African countries.  However, this argument will be explored in more depth in the next section of this essay.  It is in examining the aid flows to individual countries that we can draw a better understanding of the development of aid dependency.  Again, this is a point that will be returned to subsequently.

It is clear that aid policies over the last decade have been predicated on the willingness of African states, through institutions such as NEPAD, to continue the liberalisation of their economies.  While rhetorically, the developed world has been moving away from conditionality, it is clear that the only moves towards debt relief and increased aid come in the aftermath of African liberalisation.  Thus, we can clearly conclude that aid policies have served to limit the increased autonomy of African states on the development of their own macroeconomic policies.

Having elaborated on what we mean by autonomy in this context, and briefly explored the development of aid policies over the last decade, we must now turn our attentions to an examination of the development of world economic conditions over the last decade, and their effect on aid dependency.

The first decade of the 21^st Century has, generally speaking, been a decade of world economic growth.  The rise of China, India and other emerging markets such as Brazil as rapidly developing nations has led to a decade of prosperity.  However, within the last 24 months, it has become apparent that much of the growth of the last decade was unsustainable, and largely speculative.  That has led to a global recession, with developed countries such as Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal looking increasingly at risk of defaulting on national debt.

Africa has largely followed the growth trends of the rest of the world during that period.  This is indicated by the substantial increase in Foreign Direct Investment to Sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2000-2008.  However, despite the rapid growth of FDI into Africa during this period, it becomes clear through an examination of figure 3 below that the vast majority of this FDI was directed to oil-producing and middle-income countries.  This serves to highlight the income differentiation within African countries, a factor often ignored by examining general Sub-Saharan trends.

Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2008

Using the Tanzanian model once more, it was only at the very end of the 1990s that the state finally moved away from their enormous dependence on the traditional agricultural sector, and this saw enormous growth in the value of mineral exports at the start of this decade, rising to 39% of all exports by 2002.  Equally, a focus on export of services (primarily tourism) saw that sector leap to approximately 45% of all exports by the millennium.  And yet, the terms of trade have weakened so significantly, the growth rates of the Tanzanian economy have been greatly restricted.  These developments have occurred at the very time at which FDI in Africa was beginning to rise.  While not conclusive, we can derive from this with some probability, that the rise in FDI led Tanzania to a position where it could more easily diversify it’s economy.

The impact of the global economic recession was also strongly felt in Africa, with FDI falling rapidly over the last two years, as remittances and aid remained rose only moderately during the same period.

Again, we can get a little more insight on developments over the last 30 years through an examination of one economy as an example of aid dependency.  Again, using the example of Tanzania, we can see that the trade gap rose from under 5% in 1975 to almost 15% in the late 1990s, before falling again to under 10% in 2001.  The implication from this is that the reliance on foreign aid (given the relatively modest size of domestic savings in the Tanzanian economy) rose dramatically between 1975 and the 1990s, before falling back a little towards the start of the 21^st Century.  Given the rise in Foreign Direct Investment in the first decade of this Century, we can assume that aid dependency has continued to reduce in the last decade, though the Tanzanian state will require a marked reduction in their trade gap, in order to reassert complete autonomy on their macroeconomic policy formulation.

The overall impact on Sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade was a reduction in the dependency on aid from the period 2000-2008, as the liberalisation of the African states under NEPAD drove increases in Foreign Direct Investment, without achieving the intended substantial increases in aid.  However, the last two years have marked a notable increase in aid dependency, as Foreign Direct Investment has actually fallen within Africa during this period.

This essay has set out quite clearly the development of macroeconomic policy autonomy over the last 50 years, noting that the African states retained most autonomy over their macroeconomic policy formulation during the development period of the late 1960s and early 1970s.  We also examined the impact of aid policies on this autonomy, showing that while the rhetoric of ending conditionality has implied greater autonomy for African states, this rhetoric has occurred at a time in which African states are still being coerced towards greater liberalisation of their markets in return for increases in aid or debt relief.  This liberalisation then appears to have been ‘rewarded’, through a dramatic increase in Foreign Direct Investment, reducing the aid dependency of the African states, but doing so without addressing the trade deficits of Sub-Saharan Africa.

It is clear from this analysis that aid policies have only served to limit the autonomy of African states in macroeconomic policy formation.  However, world economic conditions over the last ten years have benefitted African autonomy greatly, as substantially increased Foreign Direct Investment combined with marginally increased aid budgets and remittances have allowed countries such as Tanzania to diversify their exports, allowing them to tackle the structural issues which have historically prevented them from closing their trade gaps.  The most significant problem with this increase in autonomy is that it has only been achieved through a reduction in sovereignty in the hope of achieving increased aid.  It is only when African states can achieve increased aid and debt relief, without macroeconomic conditionality, that this autonomy will be able to grow to a point where Sub-Saharan Africa can genuinely asset their autonomy on the development of macreconomic policy.

The below is an essay I completed last week as part of the module ‘A world of whose making?’ I’m studying with the Open University.  Amazingly, I thought it was shite, but I got very nice marks for it

In constructing an analysis of the impact of economic liberalisation on economic growth in developing countries, there are three key areas which must be explored.  Firstly, we must analyse the sources of growth in developing countries, in order to clearly define how economic growth occurs.  Secondly, we must explore how economic liberalisation has taken place in a developing economy.  And finally, we must compare these two in order to arrive at conclusions on how the process of liberalisation impacts on economic growth in developing nations.

This essay seeks to explore these two areas by examining the economic growth and liberalisation of Mexico.  I will argue that economic liberalisation has had a negative impact on the growth if the Mexican economy.

In the period between 1940 and 1965, the Mexican economy was based on a protectionist model.  By imposing high tariffs on certain classes of imports, the Mexican government sought to achieve two goals.  Firstly, by imposing high tariffs on the import of food sources such as corn, the Mexican government sought to preserve the high levels of employment which existed in the agricultural sector.  Secondly, by imposing high tariffs on the import of consumables, but not on the import of equipment used in the manufacturing of consumables, the government sought to stimulate the manufacturing industry in Mexico, and increase the value of national exports.

During this 25 year period, the protectionist model proved very successful basis for economic growth in the Mexican economy, as an average growth rate of 6.3% in real terms was achieved during this period.

In addition to the protectionist system operated by government policy, the other significant policy which assisted with Mexican economic growth during this time was the corporatist relationship which existed between government and the trade union movement.  By co-ordinating and agreeing responses on Labour issues with the trade union movement, workers were able to secure reasonable minimum wages, 8-hour working days and a number of other labour market controls.

In the early 1980s, the Mexican government quickly began to liberalise the economy, seeking to increase the economic growth of the nation.  In 1984, the Government lifted the restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment, allowing mostly US companies to began to expand into Mexico.  This would test the corporatist relationship between the state and the trade union movement, as companies sought to reduce the minimum wages which were in operation in Mexico.

The process of liberalisation was rapidly expanded in 1986 and 1987, through the reduction on tariffs imposed on the import of certain categories of goods.  In 1986, the maximum tariff stood at 100%, but this was quickly reduced to 20% by the following year.  The impact of these changes were to have a startling impact on the Mexican economy.  The lifting of prohibitive tariffs on agricultural goods, for example, would lead to an enormous reduction in the numbers of people employed in the agricultural sector.  Examining corn as one example of this change, the reduced tariffs allowed US corn-growers (who were in receipt of subsidies from the US state) to export corn to the Mexican market at lower prices than local corn, decimating the market for local corn.  The damage to the Mexican agricultural sector was exacerbated by the failure of the Mexican government to take advantage of the 15-year transitional agreements contained within NAFTA.

In 1990, 8.2 million people were employed in the Mexican agriculture sector.  However, after the implementation of NAFTA, this figure fell rapidly, reaching a low of 7.1 million people by 2000.

As the liberalisation of the Mexican economy continued, pressure mounted on the corporatist relationship which existed between the state and the trade union movement.  As Foreign Direct Investment grew, the interests of the companies investing in the Mexican economy quickly came into conflict with the interests of the members represented by trade unions.  In the face of this, the trade union movement continued to negotiate for security of employment with the state, allowing in return the reduction of wages in swathes of the country.  However, in the malaquidoras, even this was beyond the reach of the trade union movement, and wages have consistently fallen, while employment has become more and more precarious.  In the face of this, trade union membership rates have fallen to 10% of the population by 2000.

As a final example of the liberalisation of the Mexican economy, we can examine the number of state-owned firms which existed in Mexico during this period of liberalisation.  In 1982, this number stood at 1,155, as huge areas of the Mexican economy remained under state control.  However, by 1992, this number had been reduced to 232.  While no figures are available on employment in these companies during this time, it can certainly be concluded that this move, combined with the lifting of restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment, led to the export of profits from many of these industries, depriving the Mexican economy of further stimulus.

Having examined the growth of the Mexican economy, and the steps taken to liberalise the economy, we must finally look at the impact of this liberalisation on the economic growth of this developing country.

Firstly, the liberalisation of the Mexican economy has seen an enormous migration of the population, both from rural areas towards major urban areas and also out of the state.  As the agricultural sector has rapidly fallen, the employment available in rural areas has dwindled, as referenced above.  In response to this, much of the population has been forced to move towards urban areas in search of employment.  Alternatively, people have chosen to emigrate in search of higher-paid employment.  While this has resulted in significant remittances back into the Mexican economy, it is an outcome that could hardly be classified as either sustainable or desirable.

Secondly, the liberalisation of the economy has seen a substantial reduction in the number of salaried employees in total employment within the state.  What is meant by this is the number of people in receipt of a daily wage.  In 1992, 73.9% of salaried employees were categorised as being in total employment.  However, by 1998, this figure had dropped dramatically to 61.2%.  This shows us, that despite the continuing corporatist relationship between trade unions and the state, the amount of secure, full-time employment has actually dropped.  It is emblematic of falling employment which has seen more and more workers move towards self-employment or into either low-pay or no-pay employment.

The liberalisation of the labour market achieved under NAFTA had a significant impact on employment in Mexico, which has not risen since the accession in 1994.  While employment has risen in some sectors (such as manufacturing), this has been offset by falling employment in agriculture and other industries.  Due to a failure to record employment in rural areas, the exact extent of this is difficult to ascertain.

Finally, and most startlingly, the wages in Mexico have actually fallen in real terms since the liberalisation of the economy began.  During the period between 1990 and 1999, the purchasing power of the minimum wages in Mexico fell by 50%.  This was caused by three factors.  Firstly, the devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994 dramatically increased the price of imported goods.  Secondly, inflation after the accession to NAFTA rose dramatically.  And finally, due to the control exerted by the Government over the trade union movement, and their willingness to allow wage moderation, wages failed to respond to rising inflation during this period.  The combination of these three factors served to significantly reduce the real wages of Mexican workers.

As outlined above, the protectionist model of governance adopted by the Mexican government prior to liberalisation were largely successful.  While there may have been some difficulties with this model, economic growth was consistently strong, while labour conditions for the Mexican people were solid as a result of the corporatist relationship between the state and the trade union movement.

The move towards liberalisation of the Mexican economy (and most notably the accession to NAFTA) lifted the protectionist restrictions and tariffs which had been in operation during this successful period of growth.  The move towards liberalisation also exposed the difficulties with the corporatist relationship between unions and the government, as this relationship was used to reduce wages and weaken working conditions for the Mexican people.

The impacts of this liberalisation on the economic growth have been surprisingly damaging.  Liberalisation has fatally damaged rural life and employment in Mexico with many rural Mexicans forced to emigrate northwards in search of employment.  It has failed to increase employment rates, has led directly to reductions in the wages of Mexican people, and has led to a reduction in the security of employment of many workers.

It is clear from all of the above that the impact of liberalisation on the economic growth of Mexico as a developing nation has been significantly negative.

I’ve had cause to do a lot of reading recently.  For reasons that are partially related to work, and partially related to some ideas I’ve been tossing around with friends, I’ve spent some time reading about progressive movements in the UK.  The possibility of a hung parliament seems to have created an atmosphere in which people are much more comfortable talking about alliances and coalitions than normal.  While think-tanks (of which we really need more in Ireland) such as Demos and the Fabian Society have been putting considerable effort into bringing in progressive voices from Labour and Lib Dems, and even including ‘progressive Tories’.  The think-tanks have helped strengthen a conversation around progressive stances through their respective blogs – Demos blog and Next Left.  Left Foot Forward have also played a significant role in this conversation.

The conversation has been different in Ireland, but there have been attempts by group blogs such as Irish Left Review and Cedar Lounge Revolution to examine co-operation and sharing of ideas between people of the left.  But both blogs have been plagued at times by comments from readers insisting that one political party is more left than another, or that the Government should simply be branded as evil and stupid while we crouch behind our party identities.

I’m a Labour Party member, supporter, activist and employee, and for that I make no apologies.  Within the Labour Party, I know people who would describe themselves as socialists, social-democrats, liberals, trade unionists, progressives and even centrists.  And there are many who deride my party for the presence of that range of views.  Equally, people of the left love to excoriate the Green Party for the role they are playing in Government at present, just as progressive voices have savaged Sinn Féin for their failures in Government in the North.  On top of that, we have a plethora of community activists in Ireland who remain disdainful of all parties of the left.  I could go on, but my point is that the liberal left in Ireland have fundamentally failed to build a progressive majority.

Will Straw (editor of Left Foot Forward) argues that in the UK, in order to realistically campaign against child poverty or climate change, that:

It makes no sense to appeal solely to the supporters and representatives of one political party – instead we can branch out to like-minded people who have found themselves in a different political tradition or none at all.

Which is certainly a sentiment I agree with.  Many people who have expressed such sentiments in recent times, have gone on to propose a ‘Left Alliance’ of political parties – usually encompassing Labour, Sinn Féin, Green Party, Socialist Party and Socialist Workers’ Party/People Before Profit Alliance.  That argument is a politically useful one for those seeking to attract votes from voters who identify as left-wing (as when Gerry Adams made such an appeal).  However, I believe that the strategy is, at best, one that will achieve success in the very long-term, and at worst, one destined to fail.  In the current Dáil, there are 31 members of the above parties, representing just 19% of the total – by any standards, some distance from a majority.

While I would join those who assert Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael to be broadly right-of-centre parties, I do not believe that this label applies to all of their voters, or even to all of their members or public representatives.  And it is the progressives within these parties, and in broader society, who must be appealed to if we are to achieve any real and lasting change.

What I propose is a new intellectual rigour between those of those who identify as progressive.  I think we should come together in groups (be they party-based groups or non-partisan), to develop our thinking – to reevaluate our stances on jobs and employment, energy and security, the ‘national question’, climate change and environmentalism, gender constructs, and a myriad of other topics.  We should put our proposed solutions into the public realm, to be published, adapted or referred to by political and non-political groupings as required.  And we must realise that segmentation and division of the left only makes us weaker – we must focus on positive proposals, and strengthening of ideas, rather than on criticism of politics, and demeaning the efforts of others.

Ideas, not politics, were the foundations of trade unions, progressive political parties, environmentalist and feminist organisations, and community activities.  But it an absence of ideas that now stands between the status quo and a progressive majority.  Criticism of focus groups, professional communications, political polling and electoral strategies will continue, and there are more than enough spaces in all media where such conversations can occur.  But a broadening of the conversational arena is badly needed to allow new ideas to flourish outside such criticism.  Party politics, electoral battles, local differences and battles of spin will also continue.  But a more rigorous expression of progressive ideas such as the dangers of climate change, gay rights, and the right to a minimum wage has acheived success in the past, and can again in the future.

The progressive ideas highlighted above succeeded in building progressive majorities, and I believe that we can build many further such majorities – paving the way towards a progressive electoral majority.  But first we have to build those ideas.

After my post about Killian Forde’s resignation from SF, and some of the problems which I (as an outsider) thought were being experienced by SF in Dublin, I received a copy of a document from an impeccable source (who has asked not to be named).  The document was sent to the Officer Board of Dublin Sinn Féin after the June elections, but they have yet to provide any responses to the author.

The document begins in a very pessimistic fashion, showing how badly morale had been damaged by the elections:

In my opinion Sinn Féin is in serious and potentially critical decline in Dublin.
The organisation has too few members, a shortage of electable GE candidates and a membership that is frustrated and tired.
Looking at the next GE election the most likely scenario, as it now stands, is that we will lose our seat in Dublin South Central. We will also fall far short of securing seats in Dublin South West, Dublin North West, Dublin Central and Dublin North East.

And the following line shows not just the feelings of the author, but also a sentiment which I have heard expressed from many members of Sinn Féin in Dublin:

We are one election away from being totally irrelevant in Dublin and the south in general.

The remainder of the document sets out twelve areas in which Dublin Sinn Féin (and Sinn Féin in general in the south) need to focus to improve processes, target resources and build an organisation.  I list these areas below, and then provide my own brief analysis of these recommendations (generally speaking, I think the recommendations speak for themselves):

Contest a maximum of five constituencies in the next GE.

Do not contest Dublin Central.

Cumann who are not in areas elected for contesting the next GE are put into hibernation and the personnel redeployed to the target constituencies.

Organise a convention and select candidate to stand in next years Dublin Mayoral Election by October 2009.

Dublin Sinn Féin should encourage prospective candidates to put their name forward to ensure there is a healthy debate and competition internally for the Mayoral position.

Ensure an experienced DOE is appointed by October 2009 for the Mayoral election.

Provide appropriate targeted and tailored training for the candidates selected to run in the next GE.

Monitor the employment of personnel to ensure that all posts are publicly advertised and the hiring process transparent and fair.

Encourage the TDs offices to develop a quicker and more autonomous response to political developments.

Allow policy sub committees to do their work and drafts to be presented to the membership, not the A/C or General Secretary’s office, first.

Dublin SF should put forward candidates for all A/C positions for the 2010 Ard Fheis.

Start challenging decision making by the national officer board, because it now seems obvious that no one else will.

1. – 3. are obviously interlinked, expressing a view that SF should only contest Dublin South-Central, Dublin South-West, Dublin North-West, Dublin North-East and Dublin Mid-West.  The view is expressed that contesting more constituencies (including Dublin Central) will spread limited resources too thin, and that all activists should be temporarily transferred to achieve gains in these five constituencies.  From the information I have received about Eoin O Broin being a likely candidate in Dublin West, it appears that the intention of the SF leadership is to ignore these recommendations.

4. – 6. are all related to the Dublin mayoralty election.  No candidate has yet been selected, nor has a DOE for the campaign, and I’ve heard nothing about SF organising an open convention to select their candidate.  Again, it appears that the intention of the SF leadership is to ignore these recommendations.  As it happens, I would personally question the wisdom of SF contesting the Dublin mayoralty, except to raise the profile of one of their GE candidates.  Given their current weakness in the city, the odds of them being serious contenders are very limited indeed.

7. is a very sensible suggestion, that you would expect to be provided by all political parties.  I have no idea whether any action has been taken on this item.

8. is a rather explosive item, suggesting that SF has not been publicly advertising vacancies, and that unsuitable people have been employed by the party.  The document is scathing in this area, stating quite clearly that managerial appointments in Leinster House had included people with no management experience, that the DOE for Mary Lou’s campaign had never participated in an campaign of any form, and that the Head of Publicity has no PR or marketing experience.  If these allegations are true, it appears that SF have bizarre recruitment procedures to say the least.

9. – 12. all seem to be based on challenging the current power structures within the party.  These proposals clearly seek to draw power down to the elected representatives and local structures, and away from the party leadership.  The text of the document includes the following two lines which illustrate the nature of the difficulties perceived by the author:

The power and associated decision-making in the party lies with individuals not embedded structures.
There is little tolerance for dissenting opinions and nowhere for people to take those opinions.

Most of all, this document further proves the severe difficulties faced by Sinn Féin in Dublin (and in the south more broadly).

I want to be part of an organisation that can introduce the necessary legislative changes and constitutional reforms that will enable my generation to live on an island they can be proud of.

To me, this is further proof of a now established trend – the ongoing difficulties being experienced by Sinn Féin in the south (and particularly in Dublin).

Sinn Féin elected Mary Lou McDonald as an MEP in June 2004, ushering in a new kind of Sinn Féin politician – middle-class, young, articulate and moderate.  They also elected 10 members of Dublin City Council in 2004, with only the middle-class areas of Clontarf, Pembroke and Rathmines failing to elect Sinn Féin councillors.  Beyond this, they topped the poll in 6 electoral areas, and suddenly a raft of young, articulate, moderate Sinn Féin representatives existed in Dublin.  In the days and weeks after the 2004 elections, SF were on a high, and seemed destined to repeat that success in the following General Election.

As we now know, things didn’t quite pan out that way, and since the 2007 election, there has been an endlessly bad news cycle for Sinn Féin.  No point going through them all again, but there have been in the range of 20 resignations from the party (North and South) over the last two and a half years.  Within Dublin City alone, we’ve seen two resignations in Ballyfermot (Tony Smithers and then Lousie Minihan’s defection to Éirigí), one in Cabra (Nicky Kehoe), one in Crumlin (Robbie Sargent), one in North Inner City (Christy Burke), one in South West Inner City (Andrew O’Connell), and now the resignation of Killian Forde in Donaghmeade.  By any standards, 7 resignations is an astonishingly high number in such a short period of time.  Combined with their 2009 local election results, this leaves them with just 4 seats in Dublin City – a weakness only compounded by the loss of their European seat in June.

What’s amazing is that this crumbling has taken place against a back-drop of a rise in popularity for all other parties of the left – Labour, People Before Profit and the Socialist Party all saw significant gains in Dublin, so it can’t be claimed that voters have moved (as they sometimes do) to the right.  Rather, we’re seeing the end result of organisational and policy mayhem, caused in part by having a Belfast leadership out of tune with the mindset of southern voters.  Famously, Toireasa Ferris penned this article for An Phoblacht after the June elections – stating quite clearly that the party had little identity, and that a body of work needed to be done to review the organisation in the 26 counties.

It would appear from the recent resignations, that many representatives agreed with her, and that their frustration at the lack of action has now reached a level they can no longer live with.  There should be no doubt – resigning from a political party (whether as a member, activist or public representative) must be a traumatic experience.  The idea that people who do so are careerist, or traitorous is cheap, and usually they are ideas spouted by wounded activists who feel betrayed.

Ultimately, Sinn Féin faces three major problems from what I can see (and I readily acknowledge that the views of an outsider are always different to those inside a political party):

• Lack of leadership in the south
• Failure to modernise and agree a coherent identity
• Organisational structures

The lack of leadership is an obvious issue likely to face any all-island party.  We have different electoral systems, economies and social and cultural values between the two jurisdictions on the island.  This will always lead to a difficulty for citizens in one jurisdiction accepting a leader from the other.  Just as I predict this issue will become problematic for Brian Cowen if Fianna Fáil actually organise in the north, the reality is that most southern voters don’t feel an affinity to Gerry Adams as a relevant political leader.  On the other hand, if SF were to appoint a separate leader in the south, it would be automatically accepting a partitionist approach.  How they can square that circle, I have no idea, but it’s something that they urgently need to actually tackle.

Failure to modernise is the biggest criticism I hear from mates who are SF activists.  Sinn Féin as a voluntary organisation has evolved from a purely nationalist organisation, to a community focused political campaigning organisation, to a politically confused political party.  Again, they have a very difficult obstacle to overcome – moving further to the left politically is likely to gain them some popularity in urban areas, but lead to a decimation of their vote in core areas such as Cavan and Kerry.  Moving back to the community focused approach seems like the most likely approach for electoral success, but involved a rejection of the new wave of members and representatives who came on board as a result of the professionalisation of the party.  And softening the approach to move in a left-of-centre, equality-focused direction (as they have been doing) is likely to prove popular in rural areas, but would almost certainly see them continue to be squeezed by Labour in urban areas.  On top of this choice, they badly need to figure out how to keep their politics in the south from drifting from their politics in the north – a massive issue that no other political party on the island has to face.

Finally, Sinn Féin have massively significant organisational issues.  For a number of years now, they have been parachuting candidates beloved of the Belfast leadership into areas totally unsuited to them.  The best example remains Mary Lou running in Dublin Central, but strong rumour that Eoin O Broin will be their candidate in Dublin West in the next General Election show that they remain committed to this electorally foolish strategy.  In addition to this foolish strategy, they have yet to deal with the difficulty of accommodating members from republican, communitarian, socialist and liberal backgrounds under one umbrella.  Instead of adapting their organisational structures to accommodate members from these different backgrounds, structures have remained largely unchanged.  In practice, this has meant that one background has utterly dominated in any given area, leading to the plethora of identities held by various sections of the party.

In my view, these are the difficulties highlighted by the resignation of Cllr. Forde from Sinn Féin.  There’s a partner piece to this about how Labour is now attracting members and representatives from all backgrounds, but I’ll await official confirmation that Cllr. Forde is joining Labour before scribbling that one down.

I know that Fine Gael and Sinn Féin were voting against, and I know that the Labour group split on the issue (with the majority voting to suspend Busgate).  I don’t yet have the full result.

The arguments in favour were that business in the city centre had dropped by 30% or so since last March.  There was no analysis of how much of this drop was caused by the recession (and indeed it appears that the drop was similar pre-busgate to what it was after the introduction of the busgate).  There was no study of the impact of busgate on business other than a qualitative survey of Dublin City Business Association members by the City Manager.  Yes, that’s correct, there was no quantitative study of the impact on business.  The only major lobby groups calling for closure of the busgate were Brown Thomas and the Car Park owners, alongside DCBA.

And yet, here we are, with our City Council having agreed to suspend, in the face of massive public opposition.  I listened to the arguments of some of the Labour councillors last weekend, and I utterly reject them.  I heard arguments that this would prove that busgate did not impact on business, and therefore we should secure that proof to secure the long-term future of busgate.  I heard arguments that this was a one-off suspension, that would never be repeated, regardless of the outcome.  I heard arguments that it was important to work with the City Manager to move towards pedestrianisation of the city centre.

I reject all of those arguments.  To go through them one by one, I always believe the onus is on proponents of change to prove the need for their arguments.  Until tonight, busgate was the new status quo.  DCBA and others singularly failed to prove in any way that busgate was damaging to their business.  I also believe that providing one suspension will always open the door for the same arguments to be used in future to successfully guarantee a future suspension.  And I don’t agree in any way that the City Manager should be an important constituent for City Councillors (I also find the politics of the current City Manager deeply suspect, so I do not believe that he will ever work with City Councillors to move towards progressive ends within the city).

And in addition to my refutation of their arguments, I’m simply livid at the cavalier attitude with which people’s concerns were disregarded.  RTÉ Radio had a vox-pop last week (which admittedly are always somewhat unreliable), during which RTÉ were unable to find a single supporter of suspension of busgate amongst the public.  And from every conversation I’ve had (with people on all sides of the policial spectrum), I’ve yet to hear one other voice which argued for the action which has now been taken.  Bus times HAVE BEEN REDUCED, and Deloitte verified this in studies for Dublin Bus.  Similarly, the danger to cyclists has been drastically reduced by the introduction of busgate.  Tonight, DCC stuck two fingers up at Dublin voters, and stated quite clearly that they care more about the views of the City Manager and DCBA than they do about those of their voters.

DCC members will argue (with some justification) that they have tried to avoid cow-towing to the Car Park owners by providing 1,380 free parking spaces after 2pm on Thurs-Sun.  And there is clearly an agreement on all sides that the over-pricing amongst this sector is a deterrent to people shopping in town.  But I fail to see a direct correlation betweeen the two matters.  Unfortunately, Ciarán Cuffe couldn’t resist implying that cow-towing was the primary motivation, but I think that’s both unfair and dishonest.

I believe in a pedestrianised College Green, with the space reclaimed as a public plaza (a commodity in all too short supply in our city), with cars removed from the city by way of a severe congestion charge, and with significant new investment in public transport.  Until recently, I’ve never had a need to drive thanks to cycling and poor public transport.  I don’t think it’s too much to aim for a city where everyone can aim to rely on public transport, walking or cycling to travel around a city, with no undue delays, and with comfort and safety.

That will remain my aim, regardless of how stupid I believe our City Council was tonight.

PS – You can join the facebook campaign to save busgate here (which incidentally currently has 1228 members, many of them Green or Labour members, and many of them regular citizens of Dublin).

Now, I have virtually no experience of photography, bar grabbing the odd snap from time to time, so the learning curve has been fairly steep.  Along the way, I got some useable photos, some absolute shite, and (normally semi-accidentally) the odd nice photo.  Without any photo-shopping experience or knowledge, all my photos need to be spot on to begin with to make them worth publishing, which has substantially limited my useable output!

Anyway, now that things are calming down somewhat, I’m still taking a reasonable number of work photos, but also starting to take snaps for pleasure – below are some photos I’ve taken over the last six months – any comments, criticisms or advice would be greatly appreciated.

Bordeaux August 2009:

Some of the adorable kids I’ve encountered in the Labour Party:

A few campaign snaps (including the photo of Susan O’Keeffe in the red dress, which is my favourite shot of the campaign):

A few shots of my mates (apologies for the quality of the middle one – it’s the pose I like rather than the quality of the shot):

PS – for anyone wondering, the new blog title was taken from the title of the Edmund White novel: ‘The Beautiful Room is Empty”, which in turn was taken from a letter from Franz Kafka to Milena Jesenská.